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Abstract
Hamiache axiomatized the Shapley value as the unique solution verifying the inessential game property,
continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class
of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. In this paper, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-
coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value as well as the associated
game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix MSh
and the associated transformation matrix Mλ, respectively. We develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s
axiomatization of the Shapley value. The associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the
matrix equality MSh = MSh · Mλ. The diagonalization procedure of Mλ and the inessential property for
coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated
games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In addition, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study
Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class of linear values. In summary, it is illustrated that matrix analysis
is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.
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1. Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a nonempty,
finite set and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying
v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N ) and a subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2N
with S /= ∅) are called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real number v(S)
is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is denoted by s. Particularly, n denotes
the size of the player set N . We denote by G the universal game space consisting of all these TU-
games. In this paper, a TU-game 〈N, v〉 is always denoted by its column vector of worths of all
coalitions S ⊆ N in the lexicographic order (In this order, for two coalitions S = {s1, s2, . . . , ss}
and T = {t1, t2, . . . , tt }, S precedes T if and only if s = |S| < t = |T | or s = t and for some
k, 1  k < s, we have sk < tk and si = ti for all i < k.), i.e. 	v = (v(S))S⊆N,S /=∅. For example, a
3-person TU-game can be written as
	v = (v({1}), v({2}), v({3}), v({1, 2}), v({1, 3}), v({2, 3}), v({1, 2, 3}))T .
If no confusion arises, we write v instead of 	v. We only consider games with at least two
players. A game 〈N, v〉 is said to be inessential if for all coalitions S ⊆ N , v(S) = ∑i∈S v({i}).
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to
divide the overall earnings v(N) among the players in the TU-game 〈N, v〉. There is associated
a single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on G is a function  that
assigns a single payoff vector (N, v) = (i (N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn to every TU-game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G.
The so-called value i (N, v) of player i in the game 〈N, v〉 represents an assessment by i of his
gains for participating in the game.
Among all the values for TU-games, the Shapley value is the best known [1,7,9]. The Shapley
value is also a striking example of the power of the axiomatic approach. The eldest axiomatization
of the Shapley value is stated by Shapley himself [9] by referring to four properties called effi-
ciency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player property. In the framework of values for TU-games,
firstly let us review several essential properties treated in former axiomatizations of the Shapley
value. A value  on the universal game space G is said to be efficient, if∑i∈N i (N, v) = v(N)
for all games 〈N, v〉; symmetric, if π(i)(N, πv) = i (N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, all i ∈ N ,
and every permutation π on N ; linear, if (N, α · v + β · w) = α · (N, v) + β · (N,w) for
all games 〈N, v〉, 〈N,w〉, and all α, β ∈ R; inessential, if i (N, v) = v({i}) for all inessential
games 〈N, v〉, all i ∈ N ; continuous, if for every (pointwise) convergent sequence of games
{〈N, vk〉}∞k=0, say the limit of which is the game 〈N, v¯〉, the corresponding sequence of values{(N, vk)}∞k=0 converges to the value (N, v¯).
Hamiache’s recent axiomatization of the Shapley value states that the Shapley value is the
unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated con-
sistency (see [3]). In his paper, an associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 is constructed. And a sequence of
games is also defined, where the term of order m, in this sequence, is the associated game of the
term of order m − 1. He shows that this sequence of games converges and that the limit game is
inessential. The value is obtained using the inessential game property, the associated consistency
and the continuity axioms. As a by-product, neither the linearity nor the efficiency axioms are
needed. In [2], Driessen extends Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient,
symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative.
For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in
order to present a uniform approach to obtain axiomatizations of such values with reference to a
slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The
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uniqueness proofs in Hamiache’s axiomatization and Driessen’s axiomatic characterization are
rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations.
In cooperative game theory, linear transformations of games are widely used, for instance the
dual of a game. Another well-known example is that any cooperative game can be represented
as a linear combination of the unanimity games. On the other hand, there are many linear values
such as the Shapley value that can be represented as a linear combination of all the worths v(S),
S ⊆ N . So algebraic representations and matrix analysis should be a justifiable technique in
cooperative game theory. At the second World Congress of the Game Theory Society held at
Marseille, France (July 2004), Hamiache suggested a matrix approach to his axiomatization of
the Shapley value [3]. It motivates our ongoing research and for that reason the content of this
present work is partially similar to Hamiache’s work [4]. In fact, Hamiache’s work introduces a
matrix formula of the associated game and studies diagonalizable property of the representation
matrix, then presents a new (existence) proof, based on basic linear algebra, of his axiomatization
involving the Shapley value. Its uniqueness proof mainly relies on the existence of the limit game
of the sequence of the associated games, and the link of his axioms with the eldest axiomatization
of the Shapley value through efficiency, additivity, null player property, and equal treatment
property.
In this paper, the matrix approach is adopted to develop Hamiache’s axiomatization of the
Shapley value and Driessen’s extended work. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of row (resp.
column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. Particularly, both the
Shapley value and the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices
called the Shapley standard matrixMSh and the associated transformation matrixMλ, respectively.
The diagonalization procedure of Mλ and the inessential property for coalitional matrices are
fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games as
well as its limit game to be inessential. In Section 3, the associated consistency for the Shapley
value is formulated as the matrix equality MSh = MSh · Mλ. We achieve a matrix approach
for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value. In Section 4, a similar matrix approach is
applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class of linear values.
In Hamiache’s paper [4], the algebra technique (diagonalization procedure) applied to study the
representation matrix is similar to what we do in Section 2, but there are some differences in details.
Firstly, Hamiache’s paper presents an exhaustive study of the (linear independent) eigenvectors of
the associated transformation matrix Mλ. Secondly, our paper treats the uniqueness part in matrix
approach by showing that Shapley values fulfils the matrix equation MShMλ = MSh. Thirdly,
although both papers do overlap partially, the goal of each paper is different. Hamiache’s paper
introduces the use of matrices for TU games and supplies an illustration via an axiomatization of
the Shapley value. Our paper extends his results to a class of values. Generally speaking, we aim
to offer matrix representation and algebraic approach in the framework of TU-game theory. In
fact, further research based on this work is reported in a subsequent paper [10]. To conclude with,
matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game
theory.
2. The Shapley standard matrix and the associated transformation matrix
In this section some basic notions and notations are put forward for algebraic representations
and matrix analysis in the framework of cooperative game theory. And we summarize results
from Hamiache [4]. Then these results are restated and proved in our basic notions and notations
system.
1574 G. Xu et al. / Linear Algebra and its Applications 428 (2008) 1571–1586
Firstly, let us define a new type of matrix to apply matrix theory to cooperative game theory.
Definition 1. A matrix M is called a row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix if its rows (resp.
columns) are indexed by coalitions S ⊆ N in the lexicographic order. And a row-coalitional
matrix M = [ 	mS]S⊆N,S /=∅ is row-inessential if the row-vector of M indexed by coalition S verifies
	mS = ∑i∈S 	mi for all S ⊆ N , where 	mi denotes the row-vector of M indexed by coalition {i}.
Without going into details, we recall the well-known Shapley value Sh(N, v) as follows:
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,Si
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! [v(S) − v(S\{i})] for all i ∈ N.
Because of its linearity property, the Shapley value can be represented by the Shapley standard
matrix as follows.
Definition 2. Given any game 〈N, v〉, the Shapley value Sh(N, v) can be represented by the
Shapley standard matrix MSh as
Sh(N, v) = MShv,
where the matrix MSh = [MSh]i∈N,S⊆N,S /=∅ is column-coalitional defined by
[MSh]i,S =
{
(s−1)!(n−s)!
n! , if i ∈ S;
− s!(n−s−1)!
n! , if i /∈ S.
Now let us recite the definition of the associated game in [3]. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and
λ ∈ R, define its associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 as follows:
vShλ (S) := v(S) + λ
∑
j∈N\S
[v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) − v({j})] for all S ⊆ N.
The associated game may be considered as an adaptation of a given game such that it reflects an
optimistic self-evaluation of worths of coalitions.1 Notice that vShλ (∅) = 0 and moreover, vShλ = v
for all inessential games 〈N, v〉. We do not care about the trivial case λ = 0. Obviously, the worth
vShλ (S) of coalition S can be expressed as
vShλ (S) = [1 − (n − s)λ]v(S) + λ
∑
j∈N\S
v(S ∪ {j}) − λ
∑
j∈N\S
v({j}).
In order to apply matrix theory, we introduce the associated transformation matrix to represent
the associated game and the sequence of repeated associated games as follows.
Definition 3. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, its associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 can be represented
by the associated transformation matrix Mλ as
1 To be coherent with Hamiache’s [3, pp. 281–282], myopic vision of the environment, every coaliton S ignores the links
existing between players in N\S. As a consequence, a coalition S considers itself at the center of a star-like graph, which
is equivalent to say that coalition S considers players in N\S as isolated elements. Following the additional “divide and
rule” behavior, coalition S may believe that the appropriation of at least a part of the surpluses v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) − v({j}),
generated by its cooperation with each one of the isolated players j ∈ N\S, is within reach. Thus coalition S may evaluate
its own worth, vShλ (S), as the sum of its worth in the original game, v(S), and of a given percentage λ ∈ [0, 1], of all the
possible previous surpluses.
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vShλ = Mλ · v,
where the matrix Mλ = [Mλ]S,T ⊆N,S,T /=∅ is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined
by
[Mλ]S,T =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 − (n − s)λ, if T = S;
λ, if T = S ∪ {j} and j ∈ N\S;
−λ, if T = {j} and j ∈ N\S;
0, otherwise.
And its sequence of repeated associated games {〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0 is defined as
vm∗Shλ = Mλ · v(m−1)∗Shλ for all m  1, where v0∗Shλ = v.
Now the main goal is to investigate eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the associated transfor-
mation matrix Mλ. Let I be the identity matrix.
Proposition 2.1 (cf. [4]). 1 is an eigenvalue of Mλ, and eigenvectors corresponding to eigenvalue
1 are row-inessential.
Proof. Since vShλ (N) = v(N), the last row of matrix I − Mλ is the zero-vector. So 1 is an eigen-
value of Mλ. Let 	x = (xS)S⊆N,S /=∅ be an eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1. Interpret 	x
as a row-coalitional matrix. Since (I − Mλ)	x = 	0, we have
(n − s)xS −
∑
j∈N\S
xS∪{j} +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = 0 for all S ⊆ N, S /= ∅.
By this equation, for n − s = 1 and N\S = {j}, we have
xN\{j} + xj = xN for all j ∈ N.
By induction on n − s = |N\S|, we obtain
xS +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = xN for all S ⊆ N, S /= ∅.
For S being the case of one-person coalition, it holds xN = ∑j∈N xj . So we conclude
xS =
∑
j∈S
xj for all S ⊆ N, S /= ∅. 
From the inessential property of any eigenvector 	x corresponding to eigenvalue 1, it follows
immediately that the dimension of the eigenspace of eigenvalue 1 is equal to n.
Proposition 2.2 (cf. [4]). For every k(2  k  n), we have rank[(1 − kλ)I − Mλ]  2n − 1 −(
n
k
)
, and hence 1 − kλ is an eigenvalue of Mλ.
Proof. For any k(2  k  n), let 	x = (xS)S⊆N,S /=∅ be a vector such that [(1 − kλ)I − Mλ]	x = 	0.
Then the following system of linear equations holds:
(n − s − k)xS −
∑
j∈N\S
xS∪{j} +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = 0 for all S ⊆ N, S /= ∅. (2.1)
For the case of S = N , since k · xN = 0 and k /= 0, we have xN = 0. In the sequel, we show that
for any k, there are
(
n
k
)
identical equations in the linear system of [(1 − kλ)I − Mλ]	x = 	0.
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If s = n − 1 and S = N\{j}, by (2.1) we have
(1 − k)xN\{j} − xN + xj = 0.
That is
xN\{j} = 1
k − 1xj for all j ∈ N. (2.2)
We use induction on n − s such that n − s < k to show that
xS = 1
k − 1
∑
j∈N\S
xj for all S ⊆ N, S /= N, S /= ∅. (2.3)
Now suppose (2.3) is true for all n − s  t − 1, where t < k. For the case of n − s = t , let
S = N\T . By (2.1), we have
(t − k)xN\T −
∑
i∈T
x(N\T )∪{i} = −
∑
j∈T
xj .
By the inductive assumption and i ∈ T , we obtain
x(N\T )∪{i} = 1
k − 1
⎛
⎝∑
j∈T
xj − xi
⎞
⎠ .
Thus
(t − k)xN\T − t
k − 1
∑
j∈T
xj + 1
k − 1
∑
i∈T
xi = −
∑
j∈T
xj ,
(t − k)xN\T = t − k
k − 1
∑
j∈T
xj . (2.4)
So if t < k, then (2.4) implies that (2.3) holds for s = n − t and n − s < k.
Furthermore, if we start the above calculations with the conclusion that (2.3) holds for the case
t = k − 1, we reach (2.4) being true for the case t = k. Then
(
n
k
)
linear equations in [(1 − kλ)I −
Mλ]	x = 	0 are identical equations. Hence, rank[(1 − kλ)I − Mλ]  2n − 1 −
(
n
k
)
. Consequently,
1 − kλ is an eigenvalue of Mλ for 2  k  n. 
Here we recall some results in algebraic theory for getting more properties of the associated
transformation matrix Mλ.
Lemma 2.3 (Algebraic results [5]). Let A be a square matrix of order p.
(1) The dimension d of the solution space of the linear system of equations A	x = 	0 satisfies
d = p − rank(A).
(2) For every eigenvalue of matrix A, its (algebraic) multiplicity is at least the dimension of
the corresponding eigenspace.
(3) The sum of the multiplicities of all eigenvalues of matrix A equals order p.
(4) The matrix A is diagonalizable if and only if the sum of the dimensions of the distinct
eigenspaces equals p, and this happens if and only if the dimension of the eigenspace for
each eigenvalue equals the multiplicity of the eigenvalue.
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Theorem 2.4 (cf. [4]). Eigenvalues of the associated transformation matrix Mλ are 1, 1 −
kλ (k = 2, 3, . . . , n), and multiplicities corresponding to these eigenvalues are
(
n
1
)
,
(
n
k
)
(k =
2, 3, . . . , n).
Proof. Let u1 = 1 and uk = 1 − kλ (k = 2, 3, . . . , n). By Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, we know that
uk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) are eigenvalues of Mλ. Let dk denote the dimension of the eigenspace corre-
sponding to (ukI − Mλ)	x = 	0. By Proposition 2.1, we obtain d1 = n, whereas from Proposition
2.2 and Lemma 2.3(1), we derive
dk = 2n − 1 − rank(ukI − Mλ) 
(
n
k
)
(k = 2, 3, . . . , n).
Since the multiplicity mk of eigenvalue uk satisfies mk  dk , we have
2n − 1 =
n∑
k=1
mk  n +
n∑
k=2
dk 
(
n
1
)
+
n∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 1.
Thus mk = dk =
(
n
k
)
for all 1  k  n and matrix Mλ has no other eigenvalues. 
From Theorem 2.4, we conclude that matrix Mλ is diagonalizable. To prove the next theorem,
we make use of the following properties of row-coalitional matrices.
Lemma 2.5. Let M be a row-coalitional matrix and A be a matrix.
(1) If M is row-inessential, then the row-coalitional matrix MA is row-inessential.
(2) If A is invertible, then MA is row-inessential if and only if M is row-inessential.
(3) For every game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, if M is row-inessential, then the game 〈N,M · v〉 is inessential.
Proof. Write M = [ 	mS]S⊆N,S /=∅, where 	mS is the row vector of M indexed by a coalition S.
(1) Since M is row-inessential, 	mS = ∑i∈S 	mi , so 	[MA]S = 	mSA = (∑i∈S 	mi)A =∑
i∈S( 	miA) =
∑
i∈S( 	[MA]i ) for any S ⊆ N, S /= ∅. Thus MA is row-inessential.
(2) By conclusion 1, if A is invertible, then 	mSA = ∑i∈S( 	miA) = (∑i∈S 	mi)A if and only if	mS = ∑i∈S 	mi for any S ⊆ N . That is to say, M is row-inessential.
(3) If M is row-inessential, then 	mS · v = (∑i∈S 	mi) · v = ∑i∈S( 	mi · v) for every game〈N, v〉 ∈ G. Thus, M · v = [ 	mS · v]S⊆N is inessential. 
Now we present the following important properties of the associated transformation matrix
Mλ by its diagonalization procedure and Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 2.6. Let Mλ be the associated transformation matrix.
(1) Mλ = PDλP−1, where Dλ = diag(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸(
n
1
)
t imes
, 1 − 2λ, . . . , 1 − 2λ︸ ︷︷ ︸(
n
2
)
t imes
, . . . , 1 − nλ︸ ︷︷ ︸(
n
n
)
t imes
) and the
row-coalitional matrix P consists of eigenvectors of Mλ corresponding to eigenvalues
1, 1 − kλ (2  k  n).
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(2) If λ is sufficiently small, that is 0 < λ < 2
n
, then limm→∞(Mλ)m = PDP−1, where D =
diag(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−1−n times
).
(3) The row-coalitional matrix PD equals PD = [ 	x1, 	x2, . . . , 	xn, 	0, . . . , 	0] and is row-ines-
sential, where column vectors 	xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are different eigenvectors of Mλ corre-
sponding to eigenvalue 1 (	0 denotes a zero column vector).
Using the previous results, we derive the next theorem about the convergence of the sequence
of repeated associated games.
Theorem 2.7 (cf [3]). Let 0 < λ< 2
n
.The sequence of repeated associated games {〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0
converges to the game 〈N, v˜〉, where v˜ = PDP−1 · v. Furthermore, the limit game 〈N, v˜〉 is
inessential.
Proof by matrix approach. By the second conclusion of Lemma 2.6, limm→∞ vm∗Shλ =
limm→∞(Mλ)m · v = PDP−1 · v. Due to Lemma 2.5 (3) and v˜ = PDP−1 · v, the game 〈N, v˜〉
is inessential whenever the matrix PDP−1 is row-inessential. By Lemma 2.6 (3), the matrix PD is
row-inessential. Together with Lemma 2.5 (2) it follows that the matrix PDP−1 is row-inessential
too. This completes the proof. 
Remark 1. The limit game 〈N, v˜〉 of the sequence of repeated associated games merely depends
on the game 〈N, v〉 as v˜ = PDP−1v. And for any player i ∈ N , the limit worth v˜({i}) is just the
inner product of the i-th row vector of PDP−1 and the column vector v.
3. Associated consistency and the Shapley value
In this section we summarize results from Hamiache [4]. And we apply the results from the
previous section to develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
(see [3]). Firstly, we recall Hamiache’s system of axioms:
(1) (Associated consistency). For every game 〈N, v〉 and its associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉, the value
verifies (N, v) = (N, vShλ ).
(2) (Inessential game property). For every inessential game 〈N, v〉, the value verifiesi (N, v) =
v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
(3) (Continuity). For a convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0 the limit of which is the
game 〈N, v¯〉, the sequence of values satisfies convergence too, that is limk→∞ (N, vk) =
(N, v¯) (The convergence of the sequence of games is point-wise).
According to associated consistency, the value behaves invariant under the adaptation of the
game into the associated game. Because payoffs to players neither increase nor decrease, an
associated consistent rule neutralizes the possible effects of optimistic self-evaluation of worths
of coalitions. In matrix theory, it turns out that the Shapley standard matrix MSh is invariant under
multiplication with the associated transformation matrix Mλ.
Lemma 3.1 (cf. [3]). The Shapley value verifies associated consistency, that is MSh =
MShMλ.
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Sketch of the proof. Since Sh(N, v) = MShv and Sh(N, vShλ ) = MSh(Mλ · v), it suffices to
check the matrix equality MShMλ = MSh or equivalently, MSh(Mλ − I ) = 0, for showing that
the Shapley value satisfies the associated consistency. By the definition of MSh, the entry equality
[MSh(Mλ − I )]i,T = 0 for all i ∈ N and for all T ⊆ N , T /= ∅, is as follows:∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,T −
∑
S⊆N,i /∈S
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,T = 0.
Its proof is listed in the Appendix, as well as the algebraic interpretation for the associated
consistency. 
Theorem 3.2 (cf. [3]). For 0 < λ < 2
n
, the Shapley value is the unique value verifying the asso-
ciated consistency, inessential game property, and continuity.
Proof by matrix approach. The inessential game property of the Shapley value is well known.
For a convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0 the limit of which is the game 〈N, v¯〉, its
sequence of Shapley values satisfies
lim
k→∞ Sh(N, vk) = limk→∞ M
Shvk = MSh lim
k→∞ vk = M
Shv¯ = Sh(N, v¯).
Therefore the Shapley value satisfies the continuity axioms, and by Lemma 3.1 the Shapley value
verifies the associated consistency.
So, let us now turn to the uniqueness proof. Consider a value  satisfying these three axioms.
Fix the game 〈N, v〉. We show that (N, v) = Sh(N, v). By both the associated consistency and
continuity for , it holds
(N, v) = (N, v˜), where v˜ = PDP−1 · v.
Since the limit game 〈N, v˜〉 is shown to be inessential in Theorem 2.7, the inessential game prop-
erty for yieldsi (N, v˜) = v˜({i}) for all i ∈ N . In summary,(N, v) = (v˜({i}))i∈N . Similarly,
since the Shapley value also verifies these three axioms, it follows that
Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, v˜) = (v˜({i}))i∈N.
From this, we conclude (N, v) = Sh(N, v). This completes the proof. 
Remark 2. Since Sh(N, v) = MShv and v˜ = PDP−1 · v, we deduce from Sh(N, v) =
(v˜({i}))i∈N that the Shapley standard matrix MSh is just the first part of the row-coalitional
matrix PDP−1 indexed by one-person coalitions. In fact, PDP−1 is the extension of MSh by
the row inessential property.
4. TheB-associated transformation matrix andB-associated consistency
In [2], Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, sym-
metric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. The
family of least square values [8] as well as the solidarity value [6] are members of this class. For
this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to
present a uniform approach to obtain axiomatizations of such values with reference to a slightly
adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. Following the
former matrix analysis on Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value, a similar algebraic
approach is applicable to study Driessen’s work.
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Throughout this section, denote by B = {bns |n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} a collection of
positive scaling constants, with bnn = 1 for all n  2. For a given game 〈N, v〉, Driessen [2]
defined its B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 by (Bv)(∅) := 0 and (Bv)(S) := bns · v(S) for all S ⊆ N ,
S /= ∅. In terms of the B-scaling diagonal matrix B we can rewrite the B-scaled version2 of the
game 〈N, v〉 as
Bv = B · v where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S /=∅.
Incorporating this scaling procedure, the B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 is meant to represent the
optimistic self-evaluation of worths of coalitions, mathematically expressed as the associated
game of the scaled version of the initial game.
Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, Driessen defined itsB- associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 in [2] as
follows: vBλ (∅) = 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S /= ∅,
(B(vBλ ))(S) := (Bv)(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[(Bv)(S ∪ {j}) − (Bv)(S) − (Bv)({j})] i.e.,
vBλ (S) = v(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
bns+1
bns
· v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) − b
n
1
bns
· v({j})
]
.
That is
vBλ (S) = [1 − (n − s)λ] · v(S) +
λ · bns+1
bns
∑
j∈N\S
v(S ∪ {j}) − λ · b
n
1
bns
∑
j∈N\S
v({j}).
Clearly, the B-scaled game of the B-associated game is the associated game of the B-scaled
game. Analogical to the matrix approach for the associated game, we restate the B-associated
game as follows.
Definition 4. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, its B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉
vBλ = MBλ · v,
where the matrix MBλ is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined by [MBλ ]S,T =
bnt
bns
[Mλ]S,T for all S, T ⊆ N and S, T /= ∅.
And its sequence of repeated B-associated games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 is defined as
vm∗Bλ = MBλ · v(m−1)∗Bλ for all m  1, where v0∗Bλ = v.
We write Mλ instead of MBλ if it concerns the unit constants bns = 1 for all 1  s  n, and
then 〈N, vBλ 〉 is the associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 of 〈N, v〉. Next we show that the B-associated
transformation matrix MBλ inherits certain properties from the associated transformation matrix
Mλ.
2 ThisB-scaling of a game concerns a check of credibility of the characteristic function by an independent arbiter. The
task of the arbiter is to perform a scaling procedure by taking into account the sizes n and s of both the player set N and
the coalition S (but not the members of the coalition themselves). That is, for every coalition S ⊆ N , its initial worth v(S)
will be scaled down or up to bns · v(S) by some non-negative scaling number bns . For example, if bns = 1s , then the scaling
procedure involves averaging the worth of any coalition, different from the grand coalition N . By convention, bnn = 1 for
the sake of efficiency invariance expressed by the invariant worth of the grand coalition.
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Proposition 4.1. Let Mλ and MBλ be the associated transformation matrix and theB-associated
transformation matrix, respectively.
(1) MBλ = B−1MλB, where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S /=∅.
(2) MBλ and Mλ have the same eigenvalues and the same (algebraic) multiplicities of eigen-
values, and 	y is an eigenvector of MBλ if and only if B 	y is an eigenvector of Mλ.
(3) If 0 < λ < 2
n
, then limm→∞(MBλ )m = B−1 limm→∞(Mλ)mB = B−1PDP−1B.
Proof. 1. Since B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S /=∅ is diagonal and bns are positive for all 1  s  n, its
inverse matrix B−1 = diag( 1
bn|S|
)S⊆N,S /=∅ is also diagonal. For any coalition S and T , we have
[B−1MλB]S,T =
∑
R⊆N,R /=∅
[B−1]S,R[MλB]R,T = [B−1]S,S[MλB]S,T
= 1
bns
∑
R⊆N,R /=∅
[Mλ]S,R[B]R,T = 1
bns
[Mλ]S,T [B]T ,T
= b
n
t
bns
[Mλ]S,T = [MBλ ]S,T .
Thus, the similarity property MBλ = B−1MλB holds.
2. From the similarity property of conclusion 1, it is known that MBλ and Mλ have the same
eigenvalues and the same multiplicities of eigenvalues. Let 	y be an eigenvector of MBλ corre-
sponding to eigenvalue μ. Then
MBλ 	y = μ	y ⇐⇒ (B−1MλB)	y = μ	y ⇐⇒ Mλ(B 	y) = B(μ	y) = μ(B 	y).
Clearly, μ is an eigenvalue of Mλ and B 	y is an eigenvector corresponding to μ.
3. It is derived immediately from conclusion 1 and Lemma 2.6. 
Concerning the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, Ruiz et. al [8, Lemma 9, page
117], characterized its value payoff vector ψ(N, v) = (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn to be of the following
form:
ψi(N, v) = v(N)
n
+
∑
SN,Si
pns
s
· v(S) −
∑
S⊆N,S /∈i
pns
n − s · v(S) for all i ∈ N,
for a certain sequence of real numbers pns , s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Two equivalent formulae were
presented by Driessen [2, Equivalence Theorem 1.4]. Be aware that the Shapley value is widely
studied because of its many interesting properties and axiomatic characterizations as well. For
our future purposes, we interpret Ruiz’ formula as the Shapley value of an appropriately chosen
B-scaled game as follows. Its algebraic formulation is stated in the subsequent corollary.
Theorem 4.2 (cf. [2]). A value ψ on the game spaceG verifies efficiency, symmetry, and linearity
if and only if there exists a collection of constants B such that, for every game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, the
value ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv).
Corollary 4.3. A value ψ on the game space G verifies efficiency, symmetry, and linearity if
and only if there exists a B-scaling matrix B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S /=∅ such that, for any game
〈N, v〉 ∈ G, the value ψ(N, v) = MShBv.
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A value  on the game space G is said to verify B-associated consistency with respect to the
B-associated game if (N, vBλ ) = (N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ R. This property
generalizes the associated consistency with respect to the associated game.
According to the next theorem, the B-associated game is well chosen in order to guaran-
tee that the corresponding efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ satisfies the B-associated
consistency.
Theorem 4.4 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constantsB, let ψ be the corresponding efficient,
symmetric, and linear value on G. Then ψ(N, vBλ ) = ψ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all
λ ∈ R.
Proof by matrix approach. In view of Corollary 4.3, we show MShB · vBλ = MShB · v. Since
vBλ = MBλ · v, it is sufficient to check MShB · MBλ = MShB. From Proposition 4.1(1) and Lemma
3.1 respectively, we derive
MShB · MBλ = MShB · (B−1MλB) = (MShMλ)B = MShB.
This completes the proof. 
Definition 5 (cf. [2]). A value  on the game space G possesses B-inessential game property
with respect to a given collection of constants B if the value verifies i (N, v) = bn1 · v({i}) for
all B-inessential games 〈N, v〉, and for all i ∈ N . Here the game is called B-inessential if its
B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 is inessential.
Similar to the result in Theorem 2.7 about the convergence of the sequence of repeated asso-
ciated games, the next theorem states the convergence of the sequence of repeated B-associated
games.
Theorem 4.5. Let 0 < λ < 2
n
. The sequence of repeated B-associated games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0
converges to the game 〈N, v¯〉, where v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v. Furthermore, the limit game 〈N, v¯〉
is B-inessential.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1(3), the sequence of games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 converges to v¯ =
limm→∞(MBλ )m · v = B−1PDP−1B · v. So, Bv¯ = B · v¯ = PDP−1B · v. By Lemma 2.6 (3),
the matrix PD is row-inessential, and it follows from Lemma 2.5 (2) that the matrix PDP−1B
is row-inessential too. Hence, by Lemma 2.5 (3), the game 〈N,Bv¯〉 is inessential, i.e. the limit
game 〈N, v¯〉 is B-inessential. 
Remark 3. The limit game 〈N, v¯〉 of the sequence of repeated B-associated games merely
depends on the game 〈N, v〉 as v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v. And for any player i ∈ N , the worth
bn1 · v¯({i}) of the B-scaled version of the limit game, is just the inner product of the i-th
row vector of PDP−1 and the column vector Bv of the B-scaled version of the initial
game.
So far, we have presented three properties of a value on the game space G, which are the
B-inessential game property, continuity, andB-associated consistency. In the following we show
that any efficient, symmetric, and linear value verifies these three properties.
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Lemma 4.6 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constants B and any game 〈N, v〉, the corre-
sponding efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) = MShB · v verifies the
B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency.
Proof by matrix approach. By Theorem 4.4, the value ψ satisfies B-associated consistency.
If the B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 is inessential, then ψi(N, v) = Shi(N,Bv) = (Bv)({i}) = bn1 ·
v({i}) for all i ∈ N . So,ψ verifies theB-inessential game property. Let us consider any convergent
sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0, say the limit of which is the game 〈N, v〉. Since the correspond-
ing sequence of values {ψ(N, vk)}∞k=0 equals the sequence {MShB · vk}∞k=0, which converges
to MShB · v, that is the value ψ(N, v) of the limit game. This proves the continuity of the
value ψ . 
Finally, we state Driessen’s axiomatization of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. And we
present an alternative proof based on the previous algebraic results.
Theorem 4.7 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constantsB, there exists a unique valueonG ver-
ifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency (0 < λ < 2
n
),
and the value  is the efficient, symmetric, and linear value induced by B, i.e. (N, v) =
Sh(N,Bv) for all games 〈N, v〉.
Proof by matrix approach. By Lemma 4.6, it is sufficient to concentrate on the uniqueness
proof. Consider a value satisfying theB-inessential game property, continuity, andB-associated
consistency (0 < λ < 2
n
). Fix the game 〈N, v〉. We show that (N, v) = Sh(N,Bv). By both
the B-associated consistency and continuity, it holds
(N, v) = (N, v¯), where v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v.
Since the limit game 〈N, v¯〉 is B-inessential by Theorem 4.5, the B-inessential game property
for  yields i (N, v¯) = bn1 · v¯({i}) for all i ∈ N . In summary, (N, v) = bn1 · (v¯({i}))i∈N .
The proof of Theorem 3.2 yields Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, v˜), i.e. MSh = MShPDP−1. It follows
that
MShB = MShPDP−1B = MShB · B−1PDP−1B.
That is Sh(N,Bv) = Sh(N,Bv¯). Since the game 〈N,Bv¯〉 is inessential, we conclude that
Sh(N,Bv) = Sh(N,Bv¯) = bn1 · (v¯({i}))i∈N. Hence (N, v) = Sh(N,Bv). That is, (N, v)
agrees with the efficient, symmetric, and linear value induced by B. 
5. Conclusions about matrix analysis
The paper deals with the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley
value is the most important representative. The class of values is characterized by three axioms: the
B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency. As a by-product we call
neither on the linearity nor on the efficiency axiom. For this axiomatization, two types of games are
introduced, the B-scaled game and the B-associated game. They are both linear transformation
with special structure of a given game. Which imply traditional properties of linearity, efficiency
and symmetry of values. Concerning the matrix approach for the B-associated consistency of
such values, especially the associated consistency of the Shapley value, Tables 1–3 summarize
the relevant matrices, games and their mutual relationships.
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Table 1
Matrix representation of Shapley value and games
Matrix Name of matrix Value/Game Definition
MSh Shapley standard Sh(N, v) = MShv Definition 2
Mλ Associated transformation vShλ = Mλ · v Definition 3
MBλ B-asso. transformation v
B
λ = MBλ · v Definition 4
B B-scaling diagonal Bv = B · v Definition
Table 2
Convergence results
Sequence Limit Representation Property Result
{〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0 〈N, v˜〉 v˜ = PDP−1 · v Inessential game Theorem 2.7
{〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 〈N, v¯〉 v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v B-iness. game Theorem 4.5
Table 3
Associated consistency results
Property Hamiache Xu–Driessen–Sun Result
Similarity MBλ = B−1MλB Proposition 4.1
Asso. consistency Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, vShλ ) MSh = MShMλ Lemma 3.1
B-asso. consistency MShB = MShBMBλ Theorem 4.4
In [11] a similar matrix approach is applicable to study the class of so-called additive efficient
normalization of semivalues (instead of the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values).
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Appendix. Proof of Lemma 3.1
SinceSh(N, v) = MShv andSh(N, vShλ ) = MSh(Mλ · v), it suffices to checkMSh = MShMλ
for showing that the Shapley value satisfies the associated consistency, i.e. MSh(Mλ − I ) = 0.
By the definition ofMSh andMλ, for all i ∈ N and for allT ⊆ N ,T /= ∅, the entry [MSh(Mλ −
I )]i,T is as follows:
[MSh(Mλ − I )]i,T
=
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,T −
∑
S⊆N,i /∈S
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,T .
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If i ∈ T and t  2,
= (t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! [Mλ − I ]T ,T +
∑
j∈T \{i}
(t − 2)!(n − t + 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]T \{j},T
− (t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! [Mλ − I ]T \{i},T
= (t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! [−(n − t)λ] +
(t − 2)!(n − t + 1)!
n! (t − 1)λ −
(t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! λ
= (t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! [−(n − t)λ + (n − t + 1)λ − λ] = 0.
If i /∈ T and t  2,
= −
⎧⎨
⎩ t !(n − t − 1)!n! [Mλ − I ]T ,T +
∑
j∈T
(t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! [Mλ − I ]T \{j},T
⎫⎬
⎭
= −
{
t !(n − t − 1)!
n! [−(n − t)λ] +
(t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! tλ
}
= −
{
t !(n − t − 1)!
n! [−(n − t)λ + (n − t)λ]
}
= 0.
If T = {i},
= (1 − 1)!(n − 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]i,i −
∑
S⊆N,i /∈S
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,i
= (1 − 1)!(n − 1)!
n! [−(n − 1)λ] −
∑
1sn−1
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! (−λ)
(
n − 1
s
)
= −n − 1
n
λ +
∑
1sn−1
1
n
λ = 0.
If T = {j} and j /= i,
=
∑
S⊆N\{j},i∈S
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,j
−
⎧⎨
⎩1!(n − 1 − 1)!n! [Mλ − I ]j,j +
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! [Mλ − I ]S,j
⎫⎬
⎭
=
∑
1sn−1
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! (−λ)
(
n − 2
s − 1
)
−
⎧⎨
⎩1!(n − 1 − 1)!n! [−(n − 1)λ] +
∑
1sn−2
s!(n − s − 1)!
n! (−λ)
(
n − 2
s
)⎫⎬
⎭
=
∑
1sn−1
(n − s)
n(n − 1) (−λ) +
(n − 1)!
n! λ −
∑
1sn−2
n − s − 1
n(n − 1) (−λ) = 0.
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Four cases above imply that MSh = MShMλ. Thus the Shapley value satisfies the associated
consistency. 
Remark 4. A coalitional matrix M verifies the associated consistency MSh = MShM of the
Shapley value, if and only if the column space of M − I is a subspace of the null space of the
Shapley standard matrix MSh. Without proof, we emphasize that the column space of Mλ − I
equals the null space of MSh.
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